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ALASKA’S CONSTITUTION AND 
FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT: A 
HISTORICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 
JC CROFT* 
ABSTRACT
A disproportionately high segment of Alaska’s incarcerated population is non-
white, placing many of these citizens under the purview of the state’s felony 
disenfranchisement statute. This Article argues that the Alaska legislature has
impermissibly broadened the scope of the felony disenfranchisement provision
over time. This provision, expressly included in the Alaska Constitution and 
specifically debated during the convention, permits the revocation of voting
rights for a person convicted of a felony involving “moral turpitude.” Rather
than leave the definition of this provision to the courts, the Alaska legislature 
has toyed repeatedly with identifying the crimes that involve moral turpitude.
Not only is the current statute impermissibly broad but its existence exceeds
the legislature’s authority and stands in contravention of several provisions in
the state constitution. Combined, these realities warrant a challenge to the 
provision’s validity under state law.
I. INTRODUCTION
Felony disenfranchisement, or taking the right to vote away from
convicted felons, is a common practice in the United States, to varying 
degrees.1 In Alaska, the practice likely has racially imbalanced impact, as 
evidenced by available, albeit clumsy, demographic statistics and
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1. See Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, THE SENTENCING
PROJECT 1 (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/
felony-disenfranchisement-laws-in-the-united-states (noting that thirty-five 
states prevent those on parole from voting, eight states disenfranchise certain 
categories of felons or have waiting periods before re-enfranchisement, and four 
states entirely bar those with felony convictions from voting).














   
 
 




   







   
134 ALASKA LAW REVIEW Vol. 36:2
incarceration rates.2 According to the United States Census Bureau, in 
2019 American Indians and Alaska Natives make up 15.4% of the state’s 
population, while Black Americans make up 3.8%.3 Whites made up  
65.3% of the state population.4 In terms of the state’s 2018 prison 
population, Alaska Natives made up 37.32% of the incarcerated
population, while Black Americans made up 10.37%.5 Comparatively,
whites made up 43.10% of the incarcerated population.6 It stands to  
reason that the state’s felony disenfranchisement laws might affect these 
minority groups more significantly than they affect white Alaskans. 
However, if one wishes to challenge these laws, there are limited means 
to do so. 
In 1974, the United States Supreme Court held felony 
disenfranchisement is constitutional, and that decision still stands.7 While 
at least one scholar proposed that Alaska’s laws could be a violation of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, developments in the Ninth Circuit’s 
jurisprudence nullifies this argument.8 It is likely felony
disenfranchisement will continue to be allowed under federal law for the 
foreseeable future. 
Given the concerning impact of Alaska’s felony disenfranchisement 
laws and their legality under federal law, there appears to be only one
source of law remaining in which they might be challenged: the state
constitution. In other states, voting rights have been restored at the ballot 
box, by the executive branch, or by the legislature.9 But the Alaska
2. Christopher R. Murray, Felon Disenfranchisement in Alaska and the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, 23 ALASKA L. REV. 289, 289 (2006). As Murray puts it, 
“[i]ncarceration rates are, at best, an imprecise proxy for felon 
disenfranchisement. They are over-inclusive in that they include those inmates
who are ineligible to vote, as well as those incarcerated for misdemeanors, and
they are under-inclusive in that they do not include parolees or Alaska felons 
incarcerated outside of the state who are also unable to vote.” Id. at 295 n.41. 
3. QuickFacts Alaska, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https:// doc.alaska.gov/admin/ 
docs/2018Profile.pdf?08072019 (last visited Nov. 19, 2019). 
4. Id.
 5. ALASKA DEP’T OF CORRS., 2018 ALASKA OFFENDER PROFILE 11 (2019),
https://doc.alaska.gov/admin/docs/2018Profile.pdf?08072019.
 6. Id. 
7.  Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 55–56 (1974). 
8. For the argument that felony disenfranchisement violates the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, see Murray, supra note 2, at 308–312. For a counterargument,
see Deborah Periman, 9th Circuit Update: En Banc Order Vacates Felon 
Disenfranchisement Opinion, 27(3) ALASKA JUSTICE FORUM 4, 4 (2010). 
9. Greg Allen, Florida Law Restoring the Vote To Felons takes Effect, NPR (Jan.
8, 2019) https://www.npr.org/2019/01/08/683108763/florida-law-restoring-
the-vote-to-former-felons-takes-effect; Laura Vozzella, McAuliffe Restores Voting 
Rights to 13,000 Felons, THE WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 22, 2016) https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/mcauliffe-restores-voting-
rights-to-13000-felons/2016/08/22/2372bb72-6878-11e6-99bf-
















   
 
 





   
135 2019 FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
legislature has been part of the problem, as discussed below, and there is 
currently no indication that the governor or voters will take any action in
response. Frustrated activists in Minnesota confronted a similar situation, 
and are turning to the judiciary and the state constitution after inaction 
by the legislature.10 
It is that method that this Article explores: the constitutionality of
Alaska’s system of felony disenfranchisement under the state 
constitution. This analysis can serve as a model for challenging the laws 
in the future and a method others could use to challenge felony 
disenfranchisement laws in other states. 
At the outset, it is necessary to note that felony disenfranchisement 
is codified in the Alaska Constitution, although with qualifying 
language.11 In order to gain an understanding of the current state of the
system, we must first examine the history of felony disenfranchisement 
in the last frontier. Part II of this Article examines, in detail, how felony
disenfranchisement came into being in Alaska and how it evolved to
reach its modern form. Overall, the history shows growth in the breadth 
of the laws from statehood to today. 
Next, Part III of this Article uses the evidence from the historical 
record, combined with additional sources, in order to advance three
arguments that Alaska’s system of felony disenfranchisement is 
unconstitutional under the state constitution. First, I argue that the
legislature’s statutory definition of the term “felony involving moral
turpitude,” which appears in the state constitution, exceeds the legislative 
body’s powers.12 Second, I argue that the legislative definition of “felony 
involving moral turpitude,” regardless of the legislature’s power to
define the phrase, goes beyond the scope of the technical meaning and
intent behind the qualifying phrase “moral turpitude.” Third, I contend 
that the state’s current structure of laws is inconsistent with two other
provisions of the state constitution: state equal protections and the 
f0cf3a6449a6_story.html; Connor Sheets, Gov. Ivey Signs Bill Restoring ‘Thousands’
of Alabama Felons’ Right to Vote, AL.COM (Mar. 6, 2019) https://www.al.com/ 
news/2017/05/gov_ivey_signs_bill_restoring.html; Eric Cox, Released Felons Gain 
Right to Vote in Maryland After Veto Override, THE BALTIMORE SUN (Feb. 9, 2016)
https://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/bs-md-felons-voting-20160209-
story.html. 
10. Peter Callaghan, Why the Push to Restore Felon Voting Went From a Political 
Issue to a Legal One, MINNPOST (Oct. 29, 2019) https://www.minnpost.com/state-
government/2019/10/why-the-push-restore-felon-voting-rights-in-minnesota-
went-from-a-political-issue-to-a-legal-one/. 
11. ALASKA CONST. art. V, § 2. (disenfranchising felons convicted of a “felony 
involving moral turpitude”). Much of this Article will focus on the meaning of 
qualifying phrase, “involving moral turpitude.”
12. Id. 
































136 ALASKA LAW REVIEW Vol. 36:2
constitutional purpose of the state’s criminal administration.13 While 
these arguments are not an exhaustive catalog of all possible challenges 
under state law, they seem to be the strongest arguments in light of the 
historical record and Alaska Supreme Court precedent. The ultimate hope 
behind advancing these arguments is that Alaska’s laws will be  
challenged in state court in the near future.
II. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
IN ALASKA
Since statehood, Alaska has established a mechanism for felony
disenfranchisement.14 As this Article will demonstrate, the scope of the 
practice in Alaska largely hinges upon the specialized definition of the 
phrase “moral turpitude.”15 This phrase was discussed and ultimately
adopted by the state constitutional convention to modify what felonies 
merit disenfranchisement (although it was not adopted by the
convention, despite being proposed, to modify recall of public officials).
The state legislature has since defined and expanded the phrase. Overall, 
this historical narrative demonstrates a general expansion of felony 
disenfranchisement in Alaska from the early days of statehood to modern 
times. This historical section of the Article proceeds in two parts. First, I 
begin with an investigation of the concept at the Alaska Constitutional
Convention. Second, I consider the Alaska legislature’s interaction with 
the practice through the adoption and expansion of two key statutes. 
A. State Constitutional Convention
Felony disenfranchisement is codified in the Alaska Constitution.16 
It is paired with the loss of voting rights for those of “unsound mind” in 
article V, section 2.17  The full text reads, “[n]o person may vote who has 
been convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude unless his civil
rights have been restored. No person may vote who has been judicially
determined of unsound mind unless the disability has been removed.”18 
This language was adopted at the Alaska Constitutional Convention.19 
13. For state equal protections, see ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1. For the purpose
of criminal administration, see id. art. I, § 12. 
14. Id. art. V, § 2. 
15. See infra Part III.
 16. Id.
 17. Id. 
18. Id.
19. The actions, debates, and reports of the Alaska Constitutional Convention 
are contained in a multivolume series of documents and transcribed audio 
recordings. See generally  ALASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION , MINUTES OF THE
CROFT FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/29/2020 4:56 PM    
 
 

















   
  
   
   
  
   
   
 
    
   
  
137 2019 FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
The framers used similar, though slightly different language from what 
was originally proposed by the Report of the Committee on Suffrage,
Elections, and Apportionment.20 
The chairman of the Committee on Suffrage, Elections, and 
Apportionment was delegate John S. Hellenthal, an Alaska-born lawyer
from Anchorage.21  In his cover letter to the Committee Report, he
described the felony disenfranchisement provision as a measure that
“disenfranchises those convicted of felonies involving moral turpitude, 
leaving the matter of restoration of civil rights to the responsible agencies 
of government.”22 The original text submitted by the Committee read, 
“[n]o person judicially determined to be of unsound mind and no person 
convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude, unless pardoned and
restored to his civil rights, shall be qualified to vote in any State or local 
election.”23 This was not the language adopted by the convention. 
When the full convention discussed the provision, debate began by
focusing upon the loss of voting rights for those of unsound mind. The 
convention turned to the felony disenfranchisement provision after 
Mildred R. Hermann, a delegate and lawyer from Juneau, proposed an
amendment and asked unanimous consent.24 Her amendment sought to 
delete the phrase “involving moral turpitude.”25 Delegate George
Sundborg, a newspaperman from Juneau, objected.26 Mrs. Hermann 
responded by moving for the amendment, which was seconded by
delegate Yule Kilcher, a farmer and journalist from Homer.27 This 
triggered a discussion between the delegates over the amendment and the 
meaning of using “involving moral turpitude” to modify felony
disenfranchisement. 
At the prompting of Mr. Sundborg, Mrs. Hermann provided the 
reason for her amendment, stating, “I don’t think there is such a thing as
a felony that does not involve moral turpitude, so I don’t see the necessity 
of the three words.”28 Mr. Hellenthal argued, “not all felonies involve 
moral turpitude,” and pointed out the phrase was a commonly used
DAILY PROCEEDINGS (1965).
20. For the committee report, see Article on Suffrage and Elections (Dec. 5, 1955), 
in 6 ALASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MINUTES OF THE DAILY PROCEEDINGS 1– 
3 (1965) [hereinafter Article on Suffrage and Elections].
21. VICTOR FISCHER, ALASKA’S CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 76, 271 (1975). 
22. Article on Suffrage and Elections, supra note 20, at 66. 
23. Id. at 3.
 24. 2 ALASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MINUTES OF THE DAILY
PROCEEDINGS 885–90 (1965) [hereinafter 2 PROCEEDINGS]; FISCHER, supra note 21, at 
271. 
25. 2 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 890. 
26. Id.; FISCHER, supra note 21, at 274. 
27. 2 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 890; FISCHER, supra note 21, at 271. 
28. 2 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 890. 
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qualification.29 He then elaborated on the phrase’s adoption. He noted
that other language was considered but the Committee eventually
“adopted this language on the advice of the [unnamed]  adviser who  
agreed with that contention and who felt that we should not require all
persons convicted of any felony to have to go before the pardon board.”30 
He also stated the Committee wanted to disenfranchise only “those 
[felons convicted] of the more serious felonies.”31 Finally, Mr. Hellenthal 
pointed to the different classifications of felonies throughout the country 
as a basis for the inclusion of the “moral connotation.”32 When pressed 
further about which felonies involved “moral turpitude,” Mr. Hellenthal 
pointed out that the question “comes under the decisions of the courts.”33 
There is no other substantive discussion of felony 
disenfranchisement in the Alaska Constitutional Convention 
Proceedings. However, the delegates discussed the qualifier “involving
moral turpitude” at another point in the convention, while debating recall 
of public officials.34 The recall provision proposed by the Committee on 
Direct Legislation read: “[g]rounds for recall are malfeasance, 
misfeasance, nonfeasance, or conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude.”35 The “moral turpitude” language came under debate when 
Mr. Hellenthal, who had defended the phrase in the felony 
disenfranchisement context, moved to strike “involving moral turpitude”
from the recall section.36 He argued that recall should apply to “a public
official . . . irrespective of the nature of the crime.”37 In other words, a 
public official “should be subject to recall for the slightest offense.”38 As
he put it, “I know of no reason in logic or morality or common decency
which requires us to protect legislators to the extent that they can only be 
recalled for heinous crimes or those involving moral turpitude.”39 Put 
simply, Mr. Hellenthal argued, “‘[m]oral turpitude’ is too high a 
standard.”40 After more debate, the convention voted down Mr. 
Hellenthal’s amendment.41 However, the final recall section did not
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 890–91. 
31. Id. at 891. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. See ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 8.
35. Report of the Committee on Direct Legislation, Amendment and Revision (Dec.
9, 1955) in 6 ALASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MINUTES OF THE DAILY
PROCEEDINGS 17–25, 20 (1965).  
36. 2 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 1207. 
37. Id.
 38. Id.
 39. Id. at 1210. 
40. Id. at 1208. 
41. Id. at 1212. 



























    
  
  
139 2019 FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
contain the language “involving moral turpitude.” Instead, it read, “[a]ll 
elected public officials in the State, except judicial officers, are subject to 
recall. . . . Procedures and grounds for recall shall be prescribed by the 
legislature.”42 The convention decided to give the legislature the power to 
define the parameters of recall, and not to use the qualifying language of
“moral turpitude,” or any other specific grounds for recall. The
convention made a different decision when it chose to qualify felony
disenfranchisement by including a “moral turpitude” standard, without
any provision giving the legislature an express role in defining the 
language.
B. Alaska Statutes
There are mainly two modern statutes involved when investigating
Alaska’s felony disenfranchisement laws in the context of the state 
constitution. First, section 15.05.030(a) of the Alaska Statutes states: “a
person convicted of a crime that constitutes a felony involving moral
turpitude under state or federal law may not vote in a state, federal, or
municipal election[.]”43 The statute also prescribes a period of 
disenfranchisement (“from the date of the conviction through the date of 
the unconditional discharge of the person”), and gives the commissioner
of corrections the power to decide how to advise a newly-released 
individual on voter registration, without automatically registering 
them.44 The second important statutory provision is the legislative 
definition of “felony involving moral turpitude,” under section 
15.80.010(10) of the Alaska Statutes:
“felony involving moral turpitude” includes those crimes that
are immoral or wrong in themselves such as murder, 
manslaughter, assault, sexual assault, sexual abuse of a minor, 
unlawful exploitation of a minor, robbery, extortion, coercion, 
kidnapping, incest, arson, burglary, theft, forgery, criminal 
possession of a forgery device, offering a false instrument for
recording, scheme to defraud, falsifying business records,
commercial bribe receiving, commercial bribery, bribery,
receiving a bribe, perjury, perjury by inconsistent statements, 
endangering the welfare of a minor, escape, promoting
contraband, interference with official proceedings, receiving a
bribe by a witness or a juror, jury tampering, misconduct by a 
juror, tampering with physical evidence, hindering prosecution,
42. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 8.
43. ALASKA STAT. § 15.05.030(a) (2018). 
44. ALASKA STAT. § 15.05.030(a)–(b) (2018). 


























   
140 ALASKA LAW REVIEW Vol. 36:2
terroristic threatening, riot, criminal possession of explosives, 
unlawful furnishing of explosives, sex trafficking, criminal
mischief, misconduct involving a controlled substance or an
imitation controlled substance, permitting an escape, promoting 
gambling, possession of gambling records, distribution of child
pornography, and possession of child pornography[.]45 
The current versions of both section 15.05.030 and section 
15.80.010(10) of the Alaska Statutes have not been in place since 
statehood. Both provisions have changed in significant ways. In order to
understand the changes in the law over time, it is necessary to examine 
the history of each provision individually.
1. AS 15.05.030: Enacting Felony Disenfranchisement
After statehood, the first version of a felony disenfranchisement 
statute adopted by the legislature did not contain a bifurcation of 
disenfranchisement for felonies “involving moral turpitude” and the 
definition of that phrase. Instead, the original version of the statute, titled 
“Voter Disqualification for Felony Conviction,” and adopted in 1960,
read: 
No person may vote who has been convicted either by the state 
courts of Alaska, by the courts of any other state or by the federal courts, 
of a felony under Alaska law involving moral turpitude under Alaska law
unless his civil rights have been restored by law or by the proper authority 
in the jurisdiction in which the person was convicted. Felonies involving 
moral turpitude include, but are not limited to, the crimes of murder,
abortion, rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, incest, and other crimes 
which are punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary under Alaska 
law and which involve conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or 
good morals.46 
Immediately after statehood, the Alaska legislature adopted a single
felony disenfranchisement statute that took the vote away for certain 
felonies and defined what felonies might merit the loss of the right to vote. 
The legislature’s construction of the law at that point focused heavily 
upon Alaska state law, requiring the “felony involving moral turpitude” 
to both be a felony under Alaska law and to “involve moral turpitude” 
under Alaska law. Finally, the legislature created a short list of felonies
that “involve moral turpitude,” meaning the list to be illustrative, not 
exclusive. 
It was twenty years before the Alaska legislature altered the statute. 
In 1980, the legislature repealed section 15.05.030 of the Alaska Statutes
45. ALASKA STAT. § 15.80.010(10) (2018).  
46.  Act of Apr. 6, 1960, § 1.03, 1960 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 83, 85. 


















    








   
     
   
  
   
  
   
141 2019 FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
and re-enacted it with a new title, “Loss and Restoration of Voting 
Rights.”47 The new section separated felony disenfranchisement and the 
definition of “felony involving moral turpitude.”48 In terms of felony
disenfranchisement alone, the new law stated, “a person convicted of a 
crime that constitutes a felony involving moral turpitude under state law 
may not vote in a state or municipal election[.]”49 Upon release, however, 
the new language implemented a linguistic change, requiring that “[t]he 
right to vote withdrawn under this section is automatically restored upon
the unconditional discharge of the person.”50 The section contained the 
same period of disenfranchisement as the law contains today. It also 
delegated advising released felons of voting registration to the
commissioner of health and social services.51 The changes by the
legislature effectively distilled what the prior provision contained: a
“felony involving moral turpitude” must be so under Alaska law. The 
changes also expressly pointed to state and municipal elections as the 
focus of felony disenfranchisement under state law.
After the 1980 amendments to section 15.05.030 of the Alaska
Statutes, the state legislature made only two more changes to the law. In 
1986, the legislature tweaked the statutory language to provide that a 
person “may register” to vote upon unconditional discharge, striking the 
text automatically restoring the right to vote upon unconditional
discharge.52 The final change to the law occurred in 1994, when the
legislature amended the section to disenfranchise an individual convicted 
of a “felony involving moral turpitude” under state or federal law and to
bar voting in federal elections as well as state and municipal elections.53 
The 1994 changes altered what had been the rule in the state since the 
adoption of the felony disenfranchisement over thirty years earlier: rather 
than only disenfranchising for those felonies “involving moral 
turpitude,” under state law, the legislature instead expanded the 
statutory language to include felonies “involving moral turpitude” under 
federal law. The legislature also expanded the elections affected by the 
law in 1994.
2. AS 15.80.010(10): Defining Who Cannot Vote
As noted above, the legislature did not separate the specific section 
disenfranchising felons convicted of a “felony involving moral turpitude”
47.  Act of June 20, 1980, § 4, 1980 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 100, 2–3. 
48.  The change in the definition will be addressed below.
49.  Act of June 20, 1980, § 4(a), 1980 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 100, 2–3. 
50. Id.
 51. Id. § 4(b). 
52.  Act of June 5, 1986, § 1, 1986 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 85, 1. 
53.  Act of June 10, 1994, § 3, 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 111, 1–2. 
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142 ALASKA LAW REVIEW Vol. 36:2
from the definition of the modifying phrase until 1980, when the 
legislature moved the definition to a different part of the Alaska 
Statutes.54 The freshly created section defining “felony involving moral 
turpitude” stated, “‘felony involving moral turpitude’ includes those
crimes which are immoral or wrong in themselves such as murder, sexual
assault, robbery, kidnapping, incest, arson, burglary, theft, and
forgery.”55 While it remained very similar, this definition did not 
enumerate the same felonies as were listed in 1960. For instance, the 1960
version of the law denotes “abortion” as a “felony involving moral 
turpitude,”56 while the 1980 version of the law removed “abortion” and
added “arson,” “theft,” and forgery.”57 
Twenty years after the definition of “felony involving moral 
turpitude” gained its own section, the provision was vastly expanded by
the state legislature. In 2000, the Alaska legislature passed a broader
illustrative list: 
“felony involving moral turpitude” includes those crimes that
are immoral or wrong in themselves such as murder, 
manslaughter, assault, sexual assault, sexual abuse of a minor 
unlawful exploitation of a minor, robbery, extortion, coercion, 
kidnapping, incest, arson, burglary, theft, forgery, criminal 
possession of a forgery device, offering a false instrument for
recording, scheme to defraud, falsifying business records,
commercial bribe receiving, commercial bribery, bribery,
receiving a bribe, perjury, perjury by inconsistent statements, 
endangering the welfare of a minor, escape, promoting
contraband, interference with official proceedings, receiving a
bribe by a witness or a juror, jury tampering, misconduct by a 
juror, tampering with physical evidence, hindering prosecution,
terroristic threatening, riot, criminal possession of explosives, 
unlawful furnishing of explosives, promoting prostitution, 
criminal mischief, misconduct involving a controlled substance 
or an imitation controlled substance, permitting an escape,
promoting gambling, possession of gambling records,
distribution of child pornography, and possession of child 
pornography.58 
The list adopted by the legislature in 2000 is obviously an expansion 
on the versions adopted in 1960 and 1980. It is also a slight expansion on 
54. The definition was originally contained in ALASKA STAT. § 15.60.010(8). It 
is now contained in ALASKA STAT. § 15.80.010(10). 
55.  Act of June 5, 1986, § 1, 1986 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 85, 1
56.  Act of Apr. 6, 1960, § 1.03, 1960 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 83, 85.
57.  Act of June 20, 1980, § 207, 1980 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 100, 2–3. 
58.  Act of May 24, 2000, § 79, 2000 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 82, 30–31.  
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143 2019 FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
the version first submitted to the legislature by Representative Jeanette 
James.59 While none of the lists were complete accounts of what could
constitute a “felony involving moral turpitude,” the 2000 version contains
many more specific crimes that merit the loss of the right to vote, while
maintaining the illustrative function of the list through “such as”
language.60 
The Alaska state legislature has expanded both of the relevant 
statutes. In terms of felony disenfranchisement as a concept itself, the 
legislature originally sought to disenfranchise for any “felony involving
moral turpitude” under state law. Eventually, the legislature expanded
the definition to include felonies “involving moral turpitude” under 
federal law. However, the most conspicuous expansion of Alaska’s felony
disenfranchisement laws appeared in the definition of “felony involving
moral turpitude.” From 1960 to 2000, the definition was short and simple, 
though expressly not complete. In 2000, however, the legislature added 
extensive crimes that constitute a “felony involving moral turpitude” for 
the purposes of felony disenfranchisement in Alaska. 
III. EXAMINING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FELONY 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT
In considering the constitutionality of Alaska’s felony
disenfranchisement laws under the state constitution, there are three 
arguments that arise given the history of the laws and the state’s 
constitution. The following section describes and advances these three
arguments. First, this investigation begins by looking into a separation of
powers argument for the unconstitutionality of the relevant statutes. 
Second, this examination will flesh out the argument that the laws go
beyond the constitutional meaning of “moral turpitude.” Finally, this
analysis will seek to understand the argument that the laws are
inconsistent with other provisions in the state constitution. 
A. Felony Disenfranchisement and Separation of Powers: Legislative 
Authority to Define “Felony Involving Moral Turpitude”
The Alaska Supreme Court has stated, “the separation of powers and 
59. The original draft of the bill did not include “misconduct involving a
controlled substance, permitting an escape, promoting gambling, possession of 
gambling records, distribution of child pornography, and possession of child
pornography.” H.B. 163, 21st Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 1999). 
60. The legislature’s one alteration was replacing the phrase “promoting 
prostitution” with “sex trafficking” in 2012. Act of June 19, 2012, § 22, 2012 3d 
Special Sess. Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 1, 12–13. 
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its complementary doctrine of checks and balances are part of the 
constitutional framework of this state.”61 This distribution of power is  
structured by the Alaska Constitution, which “vests legislative power in
the legislature; executive power in the governor; and judicial power in the 
supreme court, superior court, and additional courts as established by the 
legislature.”62 The ultimate effect is that “[t]he separation of powers 
doctrine limits the authority of each branch to interfere in the powers that
have been delegated to the other branches.”63 One aspect of judicial power
the state constitution gives the courts is “the solemn responsibility for 
interpreting and construing Alaska’s laws, including [the state]
constitution. . . . Under Alaska’s constitution, as the highest court of the 
State of Alaska, the Supreme Court of Alaska is the final arbiter of the
meaning of Alaska’s constitution.”64 The Alaska Supreme Court “retains 
the same power to interpret constitutional terms regardless of the subject 
matter of the term,”65 although the legislative interpretation of a term may 
receive more or less weight depending on the circumstances.66 
Because the primary interpretive authority of the Alaska 
Constitution resides with the courts, the Alaska legislature may never
have had the power to define the phrase “felony involving moral 
turpitude.” A statement made by Mr. Hellenthal at Alaska’s 
Constitutional Convention supports this argument. When pressed to 
distinguish between felonies “involving moral turpitude,” Mr. Hellenthal 
replied in part, “[i]t comes under the decisions of courts.”67 It is not clear
whether or not Mr. Hellenthal meant this statement as an 
acknowledgment of the separation of powers in the state constitution or 
as a standard to be applied by the courts individually. In either case, Mr. 
Hellenthal’s statement indicates that determining the meaning of a 
“felony involving moral turpitude” is a task for the courts, not the 
legislature. That is the essential idea of this argument: Alaska’s legislature
never had the power to define what felonies merit disenfranchisement 
and what do not. It has always been an issue for the courts. 
61. Alaska Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. State, 167 P.3d 27, 34–35 (Alaska 
2007).
62. Id. at 35. 
63. Id.
64. Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated Sch. Sys., 536 P.2d 793, 815 (Alaska 1975)
(Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting).
65.  Hickel v. Cowper, 874 P.2d 922, 925 (Alaska 1994). 
66. Id. at 925 n.7; Wielechowski v. State, 403 P.3d 1141, 1146–47 (Alaska 2017). 
67. 2 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 891. 
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B. Constitutional Limits on the Meaning of “Felony Involving Moral 
Turpitude” 
The second argument examined by this Article seeks to apply Alaska
Supreme Court principles of constitutional interpretation, with the 
ultimate goal of demonstrating the Alaska legislature’s current definition 
of “felony involving moral turpitude” goes beyond the constitutional 
meaning of the phrase. In order to do this, it is first necessary to examine 
the Alaska Supreme Court’s methods of constitutional interpretation. 
After constructing a picture of how that analysis would likely proceed,
this Section will then look at the evidence the court might consider to 
discern the meaning of “felony involving moral turpitude.”
The Alaska Supreme Court has articulated its test for 
constitutionality in different ways. In Hickel v. Cowper, the court stated, 
“[t]he appropriate approach to interpreting language in the Alaska 
Constitution is well established. Constitutional provisions should be 
given a reasonable and practical interpretation in accordance with
common sense. The court should look to the plain meaning and purpose 
of the provision and intent of the framers.”68 However, in a very recent 
case the court articulated its constitutional analysis differently, writing:
Questions of constitutional and statutory interpretation, 
including the constitutionality of a statute, are questions of law
to which we apply our independent judgment. We adopt the 
rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason,
and policy. Legislative history and the historical context,
including events preceding ratification, help define the 
constitution. Statutes passed immediately after statehood grant
insight into what the founders intended. We presume statutes to
be constitutional; the party challenging the statute bears the
burden of showing otherwise.69 
What is clear from both of these tests is that no one source is 
independently dispositive for Alaska’s constitutional analysis. Instead, 
the state court takes a holistic approach to constitutional questions. In 
order to straddle both of these formulations, this Article looks to four 
sources to try to discern the meaning of the phrase “felony involving
moral turpitude.” First, it is necessary to look at the plain meaning of
68. Hickel, 874 P.2d at 926 (quoting Arco Alaska, Inc. v. State, 824 P.2d 708, 
710 (Alaska 1992)). 
69. State v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 366 P.3d 86, 90–91 (Alaska 2016) 
(footnotes omitted).  
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“moral turpitude.” Second, this Section will look at the historical context 
and the intent of the framers to try to define the constitution’s felony 
disenfranchisement provision. Third, it is helpful to look at the policy
concerns that surround felony disenfranchisement in Alaska. Fourth, this
Section will look to the Alaska Supreme Court’s cases dealing with the
qualifying language of “moral turpitude,” albeit not in the context of 
felony disenfranchisement. Finally, concluding remarks will complete
this Article’s section analyzing the second argument for
unconstitutionality. 
1. Plain meaning of “moral turpitude”
The most important definition needed to understand Alaska’s felony 
disenfranchisement laws is what qualifies “felony” for the purposes of
disenfranchisement in the constitution: “moral turpitude.” Under the 
state constitution, only those felons that committed a “felony involving 
moral turpitude,” lose their right to vote. According the legislative 
definition, this “includes those crimes that are immoral or wrong in 
themselves.”70 Definitions from several dictionaries can supplement this
conception. 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “moral turpitude” as “[c]onduct that
is contrary to justice, honesty, or morality; esp., an act that demonstrates 
depravity. In the area of legal ethics, offenses involving moral turpitude— 
such as fraud or breach of trust—traditionally make a person unfit to
practice law. . . . Also termed moral depravity.”71 Black’s defines 
“depravity” as “[t]he quality, state, or condition of being morally bad,
thoroughly evil, or ethically reprehensible; moral degeneracy; 
wickedness.”72 The Merriam-Webster Online Law Dictionary, on the other 
hand, offers two definitions for “moral turpitude.” First, it defines “moral 
turpitude,” as “an act or behavior that gravely violates the sentiment or 
accepted standard of the community.”73 The dictionary’s second
definition of “moral turpitude” states it is “a quality of dishonesty or 
other immorality that is determined by a court to be present in the 
commission of a criminal offense . . . compare malum in se.”74 Bouvier’s Law
Dictionary defines malum in se as “evil in itself.”75 As an example, 
70. ALASKA STAT. § 15.80.010(10) (2018) (emphasis added). 
71. Moral Turpitude, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis 
omitted). The dictionary’s definition of “moral depravity,” directs the reader to 
“moral turpitude,” see Moral Depravity, Id. 
72. Depravity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). This is the first
definition. The second definition is “A wicked act or habit.” Id. 
73. Moral Turpitude, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE LAW DICTIONARY. 
74. Id.
 75. Malum in se, BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1856), http://
www.constitution.org/bouv/bouvierm.txt. 





























   
 
   
147 2019 FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
Bouvier’s states “an offence malum in se is one which is naturally evil, as 
murder, theft, and the like; offences at common law are generally mala in 
se,” while “[a]n offence malum prohibitum, on the contrary, is not 
naturally an evil, but becomes so in consequence of its being forbidden;
as playing at games, which being innocent before, have become unlawful
in consequence of being forbidden.”76 
The legislative definition of the phrase seems to adhere to the Bouvier
conception of malum in se in that it concerns the nature of the crime. The 
first Merriam-Webster definition, alternatively, contemplates the severity
of the crime, while the second definition aligns generally with the 
legislative and Bouvier definitions. It is worth noting the second Merriam-
Webster definition also contains a premier role for the courts in
determining the meaning of the language. The Black’s Law Dictionary
definition finds importance in both the nature of the crime, or conduct, 
and the severity of the crime by including “depravity” in its definition. 
It is the Alaska legislature’s illustrative list of crimes that conflicts
with all of these definitions. As Murray notes, in the Alaska Statutes “[t]he
term felony involving moral turpitude is defined to include nearly all 
felonies.”77 For example, the legislature’s list of felonies “involving moral 
turpitude,” includes “gambling” and “possession of gambling records,”78 
which seem to be inconsistent with the Bouvier distinction.79 While it is 
not possible to determine what felonies the Alaska Supreme Court would 
deem have an inherent aspect of “moral turpitude,” the legislature’s 
broad list might blur the distinction between a simple felony and a felony 
involving moral turpitude.
2. Intent of the framers and historical context 
There are a few moments from the Alaska Constitutional 
Convention that illuminate the possible meaning and intent behind using 
the phrase “felony involving moral turpitude,” in article V, section 2. All
of these moments involve statements by Mr. Hellenthal, the Chairman of
the Committee on Suffrage, Elections, and Apportionment.80 When the 
qualifying language was challenged during the convention based upon 
the idea that all felonies involve moral turpitude, Mr. Hellenthal
defended its inclusion, saying, “not all felonies involve moral 
turpitude.”81 He noted the intent behind the phrase was to disenfranchise 
76. Id. This distinction was discussed by the Alaska Constitutional 
Convention in the context of recall. 2 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 1210. 
77. Murray, supra note 2, at 293. 
78. ALASKA STAT. § 15.80.010(10) (2018). 
79. See BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 70. 
80. Article on Suffrage and Elections, supra note 20, at 1. 
81. 2 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 890. 


































   
   
148 ALASKA LAW REVIEW Vol. 36:2
“those [felons convicted] of the more serious felonies.”82 The fact that the
qualifying language was ultimately included in the state constitution 
demonstrates this rationale was accepted by the convention. 
Although not in the context of felony disenfranchisement, Mr. 
Hellenthal’s beliefs in regard to the phrase “involving moral turpitude” 
in another part of the state constitution are educational. Mr. Hellenthal 
moved to strike any moral qualification in the context of public official 
recall. In his words, “I know of no reason in logic or morality or common 
decency which requires us to protect legislators to the extent that they can 
only be recalled for heinous crimes or those involving moral turpitude.”83 
In the eyes of Mr. Hellenthal, the “moral turpitude” qualification was “too
high a standard” to apply to recall,84 although it was not too high a bar in
the felony disenfranchisement context. 
A final piece of evidence regarding the historical context and the
framers’ intent comes in the form of a statute passed right after statehood. 
As the Alaska Supreme Court stated, “[s]tatutes passed immediately after 
statehood give insight into what the founders intended.”85 As noted
above, the Alaska legislature passed its first felony disenfranchisement
law in 1960. That law read: 
No person may vote who has been convicted either by the state 
courts of Alaska, by the courts of any other state or by the federal
courts, of a felony under Alaska law involving moral turpitude
under Alaska law unless his civil rights have been restored by 
law or by the proper authority in the jurisdiction in which the 
person was convicted. Felonies involving moral turpitude
include, but are not limited to, the crimes of murder, abortion, 
rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, incest, and other crimes 
which are punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary
under Alaska law and which involve conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.86 
This law does not contain the expansive list created by the Alaska
legislature in 2000. Rather, it contains a short illustrative list of severe
crimes and a description of what other felonies might “involve moral
turpitude”: those that “involve conduct contrary to justice, honesty, 
modesty, or good morals.”87 
There are a couple thoughts that one can glean from this evidence. 
82. Id. at 891. 
83. Id. at 1210. 
84. Id. at 1208. 
85.  State v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 366 P.3d 86, 90 (Alaska 2016). 
86.  Act of Apr. 6, 1960, § 1.03, 1960 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 83, 85.
87. Id.
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First, the Constitutional Convention’s inclusion of “involving moral
turpitude,” was meant to create a substantive distinction between simple
felonies and those meriting disenfranchisement. In other words, the 
framers did not believe all felonies involve moral turpitude, at least for 
the purposes of felony disenfranchisement. The second takeaway from
this evidence comes from the law passed by the legislature immediately
after statehood. That law did not contain an extensive list of felonies.
Instead, it listed seven specific crimes meant to illustrate the severity of a 
crime necessary to lose the right to vote.88 
3. Policy concerns
As pointed out in the introduction to this article, a disproportionate 
number of Alaska Natives and African Americans are incarcerated in 
Alaska.89 While the number of people jailed does not necessarily correlate 
to those disenfranchised for felony convictions, the disjoint between 
population numbers and incarceration rates should concern lawmakers. 
From a policy standpoint, it undermines the legitimacy of elections when 
minority groups are potentially kept from the ballot box in higher 
proportions by felony disenfranchisement laws. This policy argument
against a broad legal regime is buoyed by the argument that felony 
disenfranchisement might be linked to higher recidivism rates.90 
However, the policy sword cuts both ways. It is conceivable that a 
new system of disenfranchisement, one in which the state must pay
attention to those convicted of judicially-determined “felonies involving
moral turpitude,” as opposed to those convicted of simple felonies, would 
be a logistical nightmare come election day. However, without a study of 
this issue by the state, it is impossible to know what impact a change in
the state’s current felony disenfranchisement system would have, or even 
what the impact of the system is today.91 
4. Alaska Supreme Court precedent 
The Alaska Supreme Court has never directly addressed the
meaning of “felony involving moral turpitude” under article V, section 2.
88. Id. Of course, those actions that previously were thought to demonstrate 
“moral turpitude” could change over time as society progresses. For instance, the 
Alaska legislature’s 1960 version of the statute lists “abortion.” Id. This version of
the statute was published before the United States Supreme Court’s Roe v. Wade
decision, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in Valley
Hospital Association, Inc. v. Mat-Su Coalition for Choice, 948 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997). 
89. Compare U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 3 with ALASKA DEP’T OF CORRS.,
supra note 5, at 10. 
90. Guy Padraic Hamilton-Smith & Matt Vogel, The Violence of the 
Voicelessness, 22 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 407, 429 (2012).
91. There have been no “comprehensive studies of racial disparity in felon 
disenfranchisement in Alaska.” Murray, supra note 2, at 295. 
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However, the court has had occasion to address the meaning of “moral
turpitude” in various other contexts, discussed below. When taken as a 
whole, these cases highlight a few crimes that involve moral turpitude in 
the eyes of the court. Many of these cases deal with felonious conduct, 
though not all.
The court has held that theft is a crime involving moral turpitude. In
Kenai Peninsula Borough Board of Education v. Brown, a teacher was 
convicted of a misdemeanor for illegally diverting electricity from a utility 
company.92 The court wrote, “[a]n act of theft is commonly held to be an
act involving moral turpitude” in upholding the teacher’s dismissal.93 
Additionally, in Disciplinary Matter Involving Schuler, an attorney
attempted to steal cassette tapes from a Bethel store.94 While punishing
the lawyer under bar rules, the court wrote, “misdemeanor theft
constitutes a violation of disciplinary rules prohibiting illegal conduct
involving moral turpitude.”95 
Another common crime involving moral turpitude according to the 
Alaska Supreme Court is misapplication of property, which in at least two 
cases resulted from illegal conduct by attorneys. In the first, a lawyer used 
money from his firm to make a payment on his mortgage.96 The court
found he had violated a bar rule prohibiting lawyers from engaging in
“illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.”97 In the second, an attorney 
paid himself from a settlement check that was supposed to be held in trust 
for multiple plaintiffs and their attorneys.98 In suspending him for three 
years,99 the court found, as above, that the attorney had violated a bar rule
prohibiting lawyers from engaging in “illegal conduct involving moral 
turpitude.”100 
There is evidence from court opinions that find sexual abuse of a 
minor, accessory after the fact to murder, embezzlement, and falsification 
of documents are crimes involving moral turpitude. In Toney v. Fairbanks 
North Star Borough School District, Board of Education, a case involving the 
sexual abuse of a minor, the court stated that a conviction is not necessary
for teacher dismissal if there is “sufficient evidence to conclude that [the 
teacher] committed an act or acts which constituted a crime of moral
92. Kenai Peninsula Borough Bd. of Educ. v. Brown, 691 P.2d 1034, 1036
(Alaska 1984). 
93. Id. at 1039. 
94. In re Schuler, 818 P.2d 138, 138–39 (Alaska 1991). 
95. Id. at 144. 
96. In re Mann, 853 P.2d 1115, 1116 (Alaska 1993). 
97. Id. at 1117 n.2. 
98. In re Friedman, 23 P.3d 620, 622–24 (Alaska 2001). 
99. Id. at 634. 
100. Id. at 629–30. 
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turpitude.”101 In In re Webb, the court disbarred an attorney convicted of
“accessory after the fact to first degree murder,” which the court held
“constitutes engaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.”102 
Embezzlement is likely a crime involving moral turpitude, although the 
court has not explicitly held this.103 Finally, a lawyer who falsified
documents was found to have committed a crime involving moral 
turpitude for the purposes of bar punishment.104 
The crimes highlighted by these cases are not a complete 
representation of those that involve moral turpitude. There are 
undoubtedly more. It is likely the court has not had the opportunity to 
hear other cases that would add crimes to the list. However, with those 
reservations in mind, it is apparent the legislative definition of “felony
involving moral turpitude” is far more expansive and detailed than any 
specific definition hinted at by the court in over thirty years of 
jurisprudence.
Overall, these four areas the Alaska Supreme Court would look to in 
construing “felony involving moral turpitude” appear to cut towards
unconstitutionality. The plain meaning of the phrase “moral turpitude” 
envisions a substantive distinction in regard to the nature of the crime. 
Felonies do not always involve moral turpitude. The historical context 
behind the phrase points to a higher standard than the one adopted by 
the state legislature. Policy concerns, namely the possibility that felony 
disenfranchisement has a disproportionate impact on certain minority 
groups, could give the court pause. Finally, prior cases by the Alaska
Supreme Court defining “moral turpitude” seem to point to a narrower
definition of “moral turpitude” than the one adopted by the state 
legislature.
C. State Constitutional Conflicts with Felony Disenfranchisement
The third argument this Article advances in regard to the
constitutionality of Alaska’s felony disenfranchisement system looks to 
the consistency of the state statutes with provisions in the state 
constitution. In particular, two constitutional provisions appear to be 
inconsistent with the modern system: state equal protections and the 
purpose of criminal administration in the state. This Section will proceed 
101. 881 P.2d 1112, 1114 (Alaska 1994). The defendant did not dispute that
sexual abuse of a minor constitutes a crime of moral turpitude. Id.
102.  602 P.2d 408, 410 (Alaska 1979). 
103. See In re Buckalew, 731 P.2d 48, 49 n.1, 50 (Alaska 1986) (noting the court 
did not determine whether embezzlement involves moral turpitude because 
parties stipulated it did). 
104. In re Stump, 621 P.2d 263, 263–64 (Alaska 1980). 
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by examining each provision individually.
1. State Equal Protections
The Alaska Constitution provides for equal protections under the 
law in article I, section 1. That provision, titled “Inherent Rights,” reads 
in part, “[t]his constitution is dedicated to the principles that . . . all 
persons are equal and entitled to equal rights, opportunities, and
protection under the law.”105 The Alaska Supreme Court has interpreted
the state’s equal protection clause differently than the federal 
constitution’s equal protection clause. In fact, “[t]he equal protection 
provision of article I, section 1 has in some instances been interpreted 
more broadly than its federal counterpart.”106 In conjunction with this 
departure from federal law, the state court has adopted a different test for 
state equal protection: 
We have adopted a flexible sliding scale test for reviewing equal
protection claims. First, we determine what weight should be 
afforded the constitutional interest impaired by the challenged 
enactment. The nature of this interest is the most important 
variable in fixing the appropriate level of review. Second, we
examine the purposes served by a challenged statute. 
Depending on the level of review determined, the state may be 
required to show only that its objectives were legitimate, at the 
low end of the continuum, or, at the high end of the scale, that
the legislation was motivated by a compelling state interest.
Third, an evaluation of the state’s interest in the particular means
employed to further its goals must be undertaken.107 
In the context of felony disenfranchisement, the constitutional
interest the state limits is the right to vote, which is “fundamental.”108 As 
a fundamental right, the Alaska Supreme Court has stated, “we review
ballot access restrictions with strict scrutiny.”109 In order to survive this 
scrutiny, the state government must make two showings. First, the state
must “show a compelling interest in order to justify infringements of 
these [voting] rights.”110 Second, the state must show “whether less 
restrictive alternatives would have adequately protected the asserted 
governmental interests.”111 However, when it comes to voting rights, the
Alaska Supreme Court has noted, “the language of heightened scrutiny 
105. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1. 
106.  Vogler v. Miller, 651 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska 1982). 
107.  Harrod v. State, 255 P.3d 991, 1001 (Alaska 2011) (citations omitted). 
108. Vogler, 651 P.2d at 3.
109.  State v. Metcalfe, 110 P.3d 976, 979 (Alaska 2005). 
110. Id.
 111. Id.
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guides our analysis; it does not sound a death knell for the state,” 
especially given the presumption of constitutionality for a “duly-enacted 
statute.”112 
Without knowing the governmental purpose the state would 
advance in a challenge to the constitutionality of felony 
disenfranchisement, theorizing a potential outcome is difficult. However,
given the test and the level of scrutiny the court has articulated in the 
context of voting rights and state equal protections, it is at least possible 
the court would find the state’s statutes are unconstitutional. The
government’s modern conception of felony disenfranchisement is broad, 
perhaps overbroad, and possibly takes the right to vote away from felons 
that have not been convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude.113 This 
notion is buoyed by the possibility that the laws have a disproportionate
impact upon Alaska Natives and Black Americans residing in the state.114 
The state’s modern felony disenfranchisement laws are disconcerting in
the context of state equal protections. 
2. Purpose of Criminal Administration
The second constitutional provision that appears to be inconsistent
with Alaska’s modern regime of felony disenfranchisement is article I, 
section 12, which dictates the intent behind criminal administration in 
Alaska. It reads in part, “[c]riminal administration shall be based upon 
the following: the need for protecting the public, community
condemnation of the offender, the rights of victims of crimes, restitution 
from the offender, and the principle of reformation.”115 Additionally, the
Alaska Supreme Court has observed that “the twin goals of penal
administration in Alaska” are “reformation of the offender and the need
to protect the public.”116 Further, the Court has noted that “the principle
of ‘reformation’ enunciated in [the Alaska] constitution is worth the effort,
for when it works, it reduces crime.” The end sought by rehabilitation is 
a stable individual returned to community life. . . . [T]he direction of the 
correctional process must be back toward the community.”117 More 
recently, the court, while discussing factors in criminal administration
that the legislature promulgated, wrote, “the most relevant factors often 
112. Id. at 980.
 113. See Murray, supra note 2, at 293 (explaining that the term “felony 
involving moral turpitude” has been statutorily defined to include nearly all
felonies).
114. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 3; ALASKA DEP’T OF CORRS., supra note 5,
at 10. 
115. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 12. 
116.  Cleary v. State, 548 P.2d 952, 956–57 (Alaska 1976). 
117. Id. at 955. 
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will be public safety and potential for rehabilitation.”118 
When these “twin goals” are considered in light of felony
disenfranchisement laws in Alaska, it is not clear the goals are compatible
with the laws. As noted above, there is some evidence that felony 
disenfranchisement is linked to higher rates of recidivism.119 Taking the 
right to vote away from convicted felons could therefore mitigate against
the “principle of reformation.” The counterbalance to rehabilitation and
the right to vote is that the safety of the public, and the counterpoint to
recidivism rates and reformation is the threat to public safety posed by 
allowing felons to vote. In either case, there is at least some question as to 
whether or not felony disenfranchisement in Alaska achieves the state 
constitution’s stated purposes of criminal administration. 
Felony disenfranchisement in itself is not inconsistent with the 
Alaska Constitution. It is an explicit part of the document. However, the 
modern formulation of the practice in Alaska might be inconsistent with 
other provisions of the constitution. Specifically, state equal protections 
and the purpose of criminal administration might be at odds with the 
current structure of felony disenfranchisement. 
IV. CONCLUSION
The historical record concerning the adoption, and expansion, of 
felony disenfranchisement in Alaska supports at least three arguments for 
unconstitutionality under the state constitution. First, it is possible the 
state legislature never had the power to enact the felony 
disenfranchisement laws. Second, the state’s laws might exceed the
constitutional meaning and intent of felony disenfranchisement. Third, 
the laws might be inconsistent with other provisions in the state
constitution. These arguments are not the only arguments that could be
raised against taking the right to vote away from convicted felons in
Alaska. In light of the historical record, however, the three arguments
raised by this Article seem to be the strongest. 
This Article hopes to spark a necessary challenge to felony 
disenfranchisement in Alaska. In the future, if a challenge is brought
against Alaska’s laws, it is possible one of these arguments could carry
the day. It is also possible that the Alaska Supreme Court will reject these 
arguments outright. Either way, if a challenge to the laws is brought in
the near future, this Article will have served the purpose of triggering
consideration of the connection between voting rights and criminal 
justice.
118.  State v. Korkow, 314 P.3d 560, 565 (Alaska 2013). 
119. Hamilton-Smith & Vogel, supra note 90, at 429.
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Setting aside the specific theater of Alaska, this Article might also
serve a larger purpose. For those that wish to see the suffrage returned to 
the “estimated 5.85 million Americans” unable to vote today as a result of 
felony convictions, this Article might provide the impetus for a state-by-
state approach to reform.120 In some contexts, political solutions might 
arise to confront the problem of felony disenfranchisement, as happened 
in Virginia.121 But in those areas where there does not appear to be a
political solution, the next logical battleground against felony
disenfranchisement comes in the form of state constitutions. Federal law
will not help in the fight. It is therefore necessary to move to state law. 
The methods used by this Article—investigation of the state constitution
and research into the state’s constitutional history and its supporting 
jurisprudence—will be useful for fighting felony disenfranchisement in
other states. Hopefully this will result in returning the vote to those who 
have not been able to exercise their right for some time. It is time to use 
state courts to effectuate progression towards justice at the American 
ballot box. 
120. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 1, at 1. 
121. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Erik Eckholm, Virginia Governor Restores Voting
Rights to Felons, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016 
/04/23/us/governor-terry-mcauliffe-virginia-voting-rights-convicted-
felons.html?_r=0. 
